Workers’ Compensation Rate Regulation: How Price Controls Increase Costs* by Danzon, Patricia. M & Harrington, Scott. E
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Health Care Management Papers Wharton Faculty Research
4-2001
Workers’ Compensation Rate Regulation: How
Price Controls Increase Costs*
Patricia. M. Danzon
University of Pennsylvania
Scott. E. Harrington
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers
Part of the Other Economics Commons, Other Education Commons, and the Workers'
Compensation Law Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/128
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Danzon, P. M., & Harrington, S. E. (2001). Workers’ Compensation Rate Regulation: How Price Controls Increase Costs*. The Journal
of Law and Economics, 44 (1), 1-36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/320270
Workers’ Compensation Rate Regulation: How Price Controls Increase
Costs*
Abstract
In the 1980s, regulation constrained workers’ compensation insurance premiums in the face of rapid growth
in loss costs. We develop and test the hypothesis that rate suppression exacerbates loss growth, leading to
higher losses and premiums. The empirical analysis using rating class data for eight states for the period
1985–91 confirms that rate suppression, measured by lagged residual‐market share of payroll, increased loss
growth. The cost‐increasing effects are greater in the residual market than in the voluntary market, but
premiums increased more rapidly in the voluntary market. The resulting pattern of cross subsidies between
and within classes is consistent with a simple model of political influence, with subsidies to high risks and
small firms at the expense of low risks and insurer equity.
Disciplines
Other Economics | Other Education | Workers' Compensation Law
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/128
1
[Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLIV (April 2001)]
 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/2001/4401-0001$01.50
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RATE REGULATION:
HOW PRICE CONTROLS INCREASE COSTS*
PATRICIA M. DANZON
University of Pennsylvania
and SCOTT E. HARRINGTON
University of South Carolina
Abstract
In the 1980s, regulation constrained workers’ compensation insurance premiums in the
face of rapid growth in loss costs. We develop and test the hypothesis that rate suppression
exacerbates loss growth, leading to higher losses and premiums. The empirical analysis
using rating class data for eight states for the period 1985–91 confirms that rate sup-
pression, measured by lagged residual-market share of payroll, increased loss growth.
The cost-increasing effects are greater in the residual market than in the voluntary market,
but premiums increased more rapidly in the voluntary market. The resulting pattern of
cross subsidies between and within classes is consistent with a simple model of political
influence, with subsidies to high risks and small firms at the expense of low risks and
insurer equity.
I. Introduction
A fundamental prediction of economics is that price controls reduce the
supply of the good or service whose price is controlled. In the case of insurance,
the most visible effect of price controls is that insurers tighten underwriting
standards, reducing the proportion of risks that are offered insurance voluntarily.
A less obvious effect is that, since marginal insurance prices reward risk reduction
by policyholders,1 price controls may undermine incentives for loss control and
hence may actually increase the losses insured against. Although price controls
may thus be counterproductive and generate a deadweight loss, the positive theory
of regulation2 suggests that such negative-sum regulation may persist, at least
temporarily, depending on the distribution of gains and losses.
This paper tests for these predicted allocative and distributive effects of price
* We are grateful for comments from Richard Butler, Bruce Meyer, John Ruser and other partic-
ipants at seminars at Northwestern University and the American Enterprise Institute and from the
editors of this journal. This research was supported by a grant from the American Enterprise Institute.
We would also like to thank NCCI for making the data available. The views expressed here are
those of the authors, not the research sponsors.
1 See, for example, Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982).
2 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ. 211 (1976); Gary S. Becker, A
Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. Econ. 371 (1983).
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controls in workers’ compensation (WC) insurance. Employers in most states
are required to purchase WC insurance to pay for medical expenses and wage
loss arising out of work-related injuries and diseases or to provide proof of
financial responsibility. In the 1980s, regulators in some states responded to
rapidly rising loss costs by denying premium rate increases.3 Insurers responded
by reducing the proportion of risks accepted in the voluntary market, assigning
the remainder to residual-market mechanisms that exist in all states. By the late
1980s, the countrywide residual-market deficit relative to premiums reached
19 percent and the residual-market share of premiums exceeded 50 percent in
some states, threatening the viability of the WC insurance market. Residual-
market deficits are generally financed by assessments on all WC insurers in
proportion to their voluntary-market premiums in the state. These assessments
may be passed forward as higher premiums to voluntary-market policyholders
or passed back to insurer equity, depending on regulatory constraints and market
conditions. This residual-market “tax” in turn creates incentives for policyholders
to shift to self-insurance and for insurers to exit the market, thereby shrinking
the tax base and increasing the tax rate on those policyholders and insurers who
remain. In response to deteriorating market conditions, many states modified
their statutory benefits, increased rate levels, and adopted other measures that
substantially improved the situation by the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, because the
underlying regulatory structure is unchanged in many states, the possibility re-
mains for a recurrence of the 1980s meltdown in WC and in other lines of
insurance that have similar regulatory structures and residual-market mechanisms.
Regulatory constraints on WC pricing may exacerbate the rate of growth of
loss costs through several mechanisms. First, the suppression of rates below
competitive levels in the residual market acts as a subsidy to high-risk activities.
Second, to the extent that regulation reduces experience rating, employers have
reduced incentives to invest in loss control and to require such investments by
employees. Third, if regulation constrains the pass-through of insurer expense
markups for loss control but permits the pass-through of loss costs, insurers may
reduce investments in loss control, leading to increased injury rates and/or higher
claim costs. Fourth, the pooling of losses among insurers through residual-market
mechanisms may, under certain circumstances, reduce incentives for servicing
carriers to invest in loss control.
Our empirical analysis of the effects of rate suppression on loss growth uses
voluntary- and residual-market data for the 150 largest rating classes in eight
states that differed in regulatory regime, for 5 years between 1985 and 1991.4
As a measure of rate suppression, we use the lagged, class-specific residual-
3 Workers compensation loss costs per $100 of payroll increased from $.95 in 1978 to $1.56 in
1989 and $2.4 in 1991. See Robert W. Klein, Eric C. Nordman, & Julienne L. Fritz, Market Con-
ditions in Workers’ Compensation Insurance (1993); and William J. Nelson, Workers’ Compensation:
Coverage, Benefits, and Costs, 1990–91, 56 Soc. Sec. Bull. 68 (1993).
4 The 5 policy years span slightly different calendar years in different states.
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market share of payroll, as an instrument for the proportion of risks for whom
insurers expect the voluntary-market rates to be inadequate. We find that loss
growth is positively and significantly related to rate suppression, with larger
effects in the residual market than the voluntary market, as expected. By contrast,
premium growth exceeds loss growth in the voluntary market, consistent with
the cross-subsidy hypothesis. We show that the pattern of cross subsidies between
and within classes in a state is consistent with a simple model of political
influence.
Most previous studies of insurance rate regulation have focused on industry
or consumer capture of the regulatory process.5 Rate regulation has generally
been measured by an indicator variable for statutory type of regulation, in par-
ticular, prior approval versus open competition. The empirical evidence has been
inconclusive, possibly reflecting real variation in the way that prior-approval
regulation is implemented in different states and over time.6 Moreover, as David
Appel, Michael McMurray, and Mark Mulvaney note, the form of regulation
may be endogenous; specifically, high-cost states may have been more likely to
deregulate.
The possibility that rate regulation may lead to higher losses is discussed but
not analyzed empirically by Scott Harrington, Patricia Danzon, Orin Kramer, and
Robert Klein, Eric Nordman, and Julienne Fritz.7 Robert Kaestner and Anne
Carroll and Anthony Barkume and John Ruser examine the effects of deregulation
on premiums and injury rates, but the evidence is inconclusive.8 Kaestner and
Carroll conclude that regulation leads to higher premiums, which they attribute
to industry capture of the regulatory process, and that high premiums reduce
injury rates, owing to increased incentives for loss control. Effects of regulation
on premiums are inferred from a single-year cross-section regression of wage
rates on a prior-approval indicator and other controls. Such cross-sectional es-
5 For example, David Appel, Michael McMurray, & Mark Mulvaney, An Analysis of the Net
Costs of Workers’ Compensation Insurance (1992); Klein, Nordman, & Fritz, supra note 3; Anne
M. Carroll & Robert Kaestner, The Relationship between Regulation and Prices in the Workers’
Compensation Insurance Market, 8 J. Reg. Econ. 149 (1995); Timothy P. Schmidle, The Impact of
Insurance Pricing Deregulation on Workers’ Compensation Costs, 8 Workers’ Compensation Monitor
1 (1995). For a summary of the literature on automobile regulation, see Scott E. Harrington, The
Impact of Rate Regulation on Automobile Insurance Loss Ratios: Some New Empirical Evidence,
3 J. Ins. Reg. 182 (1984).
6 As of the early 1990s, very few states had true competitive rating systems that permit insurers
to alter rates without close regulatory scrutiny. Moreover, regulation of residual-market rates could
still effectively suppress voluntary-market rates.
7 Scott E. Harrington, Rate Suppression (Presidential Address), 59 J. Risk & Ins. 185 (1992);
Patricia M. Danzon, Administrative Costs, Price Regulation and Efficiency: A New Look at Old
Issues (paper presented at the NCCI Conference on Workers’ Compensation Issues, Philadelphia
1992); Orin S. Kramer, Rate Suppression, Rate-of-Return Regulation, and Solvency, 10 J. Ins. Reg.
523 (1992); and Klein, Nordman, & Fritz, supra note 3.
8 Robert Kaestner & Anne M. Carroll, New Estimates of the Labor Market Effects of Workers’
Compensation Insurance, 63 S. Econ. J. 635 (1997); and Anthony J. Barkume & John W. Ruser,
Deregulating Property-Casualty Insurance Pricing: The Case of Workers’ Compensation, in this issue,
at 37.
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timates are likely to be unreliable both because prior-approval regimes differ
across states and because of the dynamic effects of regulation on loss costs.
Specifically, if regulation raises premiums and this reduces losses, as Kaestner
and Carroll hypothesize, premiums must ultimately be lower in regulated states,
unless regulatory capture raises markups over loss costs to implausibly high
levels. Similarly, if regulation suppresses premiums, which leads to higher losses,
as we hypothesize, premiums must eventually be higher to cover the higher loss
costs in regulated states, which may lead to regulatory correction as occurred in
the 1990s WC reforms. Thus the estimated cross-sectional relationship between
average premiums and a regulatory regime indicator depends critically on the
point in the cycle at which the relationship is estimated, which may differ across
states at any point in time, exacerbating the intrinsic heterogeneity within type
of regulatory regime. More generally, their regulatory capture theory cannot
explain the persistence and growth of residual markets over their 1983–90 period.
Barkume and Ruser, using a longer time series, find that states that dropped
both prior approval and rate bureau pricing had lower injury rates and lower
premiums. They conclude that their results are consistent with two very different
theories of regulation. Their cartel theory predicts that regulation raises prices,
thereby protecting insurers who are inefficient at loss control, which leads to
higher loss costs. Their alternative theory, like ours, hypothesizes that regulation
suppresses rates, thereby reducing incentives for loss control, which leads to
higher injuries and premiums.
Our approach offers several advantages over these previous studies. First, we
measure rate suppression directly by the size of the residual market, instead of
inferring rate adequacy from a regulatory regime indicator. Barkume and Ruser
concur that this is the best approach to resolve the ambiguity of their findings.
Second, by estimating the effects of rate suppression (residual-market share) on
loss and premium growth rates, our estimates avoid the ambiguity of cross-
sectional analysis, that rate suppression tends to lower premiums but the resulting
loss increase tends to raise premiums, leading to an ambiguous overall predicted
relationship between regulation and premium levels in a single cross section.
Third, we estimate effects separately for the residual and voluntary markets,
which permits tests for differential effects of regulation on loss and premium
growth in the voluntary and residual markets. Fourth, our study is the first to
analyze the redistributive effects of regulation between policyholders using class-
level data. A further advantage of our data is that losses, premiums, and rate
suppression refer to the same class-level exposure base. Both Barkume and Ruser
and Kaestner and Carroll draw premiums and injury rates from different data-
bases, which raises the possibility that difference in sample frame may bias
estimates of the differential effects of regulation on premiums and losses.
In this paper, Section II provides background on workers’ compensation
insurance and prior work. Section III develops our hypotheses on the cost-
increasing effects of regulation. Section IV describes the data and methodology.
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Section V reports the analysis of cost growth. Section VI reports the analysis of
cross subsidies. Section VII concludes.
II. Background and Previous Studies
A. Workers’ Compensation Rating
Regulation of workers’ compensation insurance rates in most states historically
required all insurers to use the same rates, rating classes, and experience-rating
plans. Rate advisory organizations—the National Council of Compensation In-
surers (NCCI) in most states—collected loss and expense data from all insurers
and used these data to develop and file class-level “advisory rates” on behalf of
the industry. Since the 1970s, most states have permitted individual insurers to
file for deviations from the advisory rates, generally the same percent for each
rating class. In the 1980s and 1990s, advisory rates were replaced by “prospective
loss costs,” from which insurers can file deviations and add their own expense
and profit loading to derive their manual rates, by class. Some states eliminated
prior-approval requirements entirely.
An individual employer’s actual rate per $100 payroll is a payroll-weighted
average of the manual rate for each class employed by the firm, adjusted for
experience rating (the employer’s own loss experience relative to the class av-
erage) and schedule-rating credits/debits based on individual underwriting as-
sessment. Large firms are fully self-rated, medium-sized firms pay a weighted
average based on their own experience and class rates, and very small firms pay
pure class rates. In addition, insurers may compete through dividends to above-
average-risk employers and through service quality. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
increasingly stringent regulation of NCCI manual rates led to fewer downward
deviations, smaller schedule-rating credits and dividends, and larger residual
markets and residual-market deficits.
Residual-market mechanisms provide insurance at regulated rates to firms that
cannot obtain coverage in the voluntary market. The most common residual-
market structure assigns policyholders to designated servicing carriers, who ser-
vice the policy without assuming underwriting risk. Residual-market deficits are
usually prorated across all insurers in proportion to their voluntary-market pre-
mium in the state. The expected additional residual-market assessment thus acts
as an ad valorem tax that is part of the marginal cost of writing new voluntary-
market business. How far this tax can be passed through to policyholders in the
voluntary market depends on the regulation and costs of self-insurance,9 regu-
lation of voluntary-market rates, and residual-market rates that constrain the rates
that can be charged in the voluntary market. Even if insurers cannot fully recoup
residual-market deficits by pass-through to the voluntary market, insurer exit
9 Self-insured employers avoid all residual-market assessments. Switching to self-insurance is
constrained by regulation, including minimum size requirements, and by switching costs for
employers.
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may be slow, given quasi rents on sunk investments in tangible and intangible
capital.10
The statutory purpose of rate regulation is to assure that rates are not excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. However, the regulatory process may be
exploited by politically powerful groups to obtain rates that differ systematically
from expected loss costs, conditional on available information. Rate suppression
and residual-market mechanisms can generate cross subsidies within and between
classes, as well as from insurer capital. This is discussed further in Section VI.
B. Previous Studies
As discussed in the Section I, several previous studies have tested the hy-
pothesis of industry versus consumer capture of the regulatory process on av-
erage, using indicator variables for regulatory type (prior approval versus open
competition, mandatory bureau rates, and so on). Results have been inconclusive,
plausibly because details of structure and implementation of a given regulatory
type differ across states and over time and may be endogenous and because most
prior studies have ignored the feedback from regulation to losses and ultimately
to premiums, which confounds cross-sectional measures of effects of regulation
on premiums or loss ratios.
Several studies of the moral hazard effects of weak experience rating have
confirmed that higher WC benefits tend to increase the frequency and duration
of claims, particularly in firms that are only weakly experience rated.11 Richard
Butler examines the determinants of WC cost growth, focusing on increases in
statutory benefits, declines in waiting periods, and demographic changes in the
workforce.12 He concludes that loss growth largely reflects increased claims
reporting rather than increased employer or employee risk-taking behavior. Butler
and John Worral and Alan Krueger report similar results.13 These studies do not
test for effects of rate suppression on loss growth, which we find to be significant
after controlling for benefit structure changes.
There has been little analysis of cross subsidies between policyholders in
workers’ compensation—either measurement or modeling of the political process.
One recent exception is by Wook Kwon and Martin Grace, who examine the
10 Harrington, supra note 7.
11 For example, James R. Chelius & Karen Kavanaugh, Workers’ Compensation and the Level of
Occupational Injuries, 55 J. Risk & Ins. 315 (1988); Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, Substitution
between Unemployment Insurance and Workers’ Compensation: An Analysis Applied to the Risk
of Workplace Accidents, 49 J. Pub. Econ. 287 (1992); John W. Ruser, Workers’ Compensation
Insurance, Experience Rating, and Occupational Injuries, 16 Rand J. Econ. 487 (1985); Bruce D.
Meyer, W. Kip Viscusi, & David L. Durbin, Workers’ Compensation and Injury Duration: Evidence
from a Natural Experiment, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 322 (1995).
12 Richard J. Butler, Economic Determinants of Workers’ Compensation Trends, 61 J. Risk & Ins.
383 (1994).
13 Richard J. Butler & John D. Worral, Claims Reporting and Risk-Bearing Moral Hazard in
Workers’ Compensation Market, 58 J. Risk Ins. 191 (1991); Alan B. Krueger, Incentive Effects of
Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 41 J. Pub. Econ. 73 (1990).
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effects of residual-market deficits, current and lagged, on premium/loss ratios (a
proxy for the expense and profit loading) in the voluntary market, the residual
market, and the statewide aggregate market, using state-level data.14 They con-
clude that about one-fourth of residual-market assessments are passed through
to the voluntary market and that current-year residual-market deficits negatively
affect both residual-market and aggregate-market loadings. These findings may
be biased if current residual-market deficits (and possibly loss costs) are influ-
enced by current premium levels.
III. Theory
Workplace accidents are multiparty accidents, for which optimal prevention
requires care by employers and employees. Employers are strictly liable and are
required to carry liability insurance. If insurance prices cannot reflect the expected
costs of risky behavior, for example, because of asymmetric information, moral
hazard undermines incentives for optimal loss control.15 Insurance price regu-
lation may further distort marginal insurance prices, undermining loss control
incentives of employers, employees, and insurers through several channels, and,
hence, lead to higher loss costs.
A. Cost-Increasing Effects of Rate Suppression
Subsidies to High-Risk Behavior. Rate regulation tends to damp experience
rating, by reducing the experience modification factors and/or by reducing the
base rate to which the factors apply. This reduces employers’ incentives to invest
in loss control, including control of employees’ postinjury moral hazard—overuse
of rehabilitation services and delay in return to work. With pure class rating, the
employer who invests in accident prevention or claim control bears all the costs,
but any benefits of lower claim costs are diffused across all policyholders in the
class. Suppression of experience rating is thus expected to raise injury rates and
claim costs, conditional on the distribution of firms and occupations. In addition,
suppression of rate differentials may lead to an increase in the proportion of
high-risk occupations and firms. These effects are expected to be greater in the
residual market than in the voluntary market.
Constraints on Insurer Expense and Profit Loadings. Regulation may con-
strain an insurer’s expense and profit markup but (largely) permit the pass-through
of an increase in expected losses. If so, insurers may reduce loss control even
if total costs thereby increase, because the resulting increase in losses can be
(largely) passed through as higher premiums whereas the loss control expense
14 Wook J. Kwon & Martin F. Grace, Examination of Cross Subsidies in the Workers’ Compensation
Market, 15 J. Ins. Reg. 256 (1996).
15 Shavell, supra note 1.
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comes out of profit.16 Reduction in insurer injury prevention programs could
increase the frequency and severity of injuries; in addition, diminished effort to
control invalid or excessive claims could increase claim frequency and severity,
conditional on injuries. On the other hand, profit constraints that reduce quality
competition could lead insurers to deny more claims, which could reduce reported
claim frequency, ceteris paribus. Thus the predicted effect of insurer response
to rate suppression on reported claim frequency is ambiguous, particularly for
the voluntary market where quality competition would exist in the absence of
rate suppression.
Pooling of Residual-Market Deficits. In the dominant residual-market model
during our sample period, one or more servicing carriers are selected to administer
the program in return for a fixed proportion of premiums. Any operating deficit
(excess of losses plus expenses over premiums) is prorated to all insurers in
proportion to their voluntary WC premium volume in the state. Since the serv-
icing carrier bears all the costs of loss control but receives only a fraction of
any resulting reduction in losses, incentives for loss control may be suboptimal.
This effect would exacerbate loss growth in the residual market relative to the
voluntary market, ceteris paribus. However, this free-rider incentive may be
countered by the monitoring and incentive programs that exist in most states,
the insurer’s concern for reputation and future business, and the incentives that
the servicing carrier faces for its voluntary-market business, where it bears all
costs. Separate loss control programs could be established for its residual- and
voluntary-market business, but this would entail fixed costs. If so, any cost-
increasing effects from pooling residual-market deficits are predicted to increase
with the size of the residual market.
B. Winners and Losers from Rate Suppression
Modeling the market for influence over workers’ compensation rates requires
assumptions about the incidence of premiums and service quality. Simple theory
and empirical evidence conclude that the long-run incidence of workers’ com-
pensation premiums is largely on workers, through compensating wage offsets.17
Thus the primary beneficiaries of rate suppression are workers for whom rates
are suppressed below competitive levels, who benefit from higher wages or more
jobs than would be available if insurers charged actuarial rates. Some benefit
may also accrue to owners of immobile factors such as entrepreneurial capital,
16 Optimal loss control requires investing to the point where the marginal dollar invested in
prevention or claims management reduces expected loss cost by just 1 dollar.
17 For example, W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Workers’ Compensation: Wage Effects,
Benefit Inadequacies, and the Value of Health Losses, 69 Rev. Econ. Stat. 249 (1987); Jonathan
Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer Provided Insurance: Lessons
from Workers’ Compensation Insurance (working paper, Princeton Univ.. Indus. Rel. Section, No-
vember 1990). For effects of unionization on wage offsets and structure of risk compensation, see
Price V. Fishback, Review of Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk, 32 J.
Econ. Literature 131 (1992).
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if insurance rates deviate from levels that were anticipated when wage rates were
set or from levels that prevail for similar employees in other states.18
The costs of rate suppression—higher loss costs and reduced quality—may
be partly borne by employers and employees in the cross-subsidized firms,
through lower dividends, lower experience-rating credits, and reduced service
quality, including denial of or delay in claim payment. Denial of medical claims
by the WC insurer may shift costs to the employers’ first-party medical insurance,
which is typically self-insured for medium and large employers.
But if persistent rate suppression is a politically rational strategy for some
classes, some of the resulting cost increase must be shifted to other policyholders
or insurer equity. The results by Kwon and Grace suggest that both forms of
shifting occur.19 Here we focus on cross subsidies between policyholders within
a state. Between-class transfers can result from suppression of class-rate relativ-
ities for manual rates. Within-class transfers from low to high risks can result
from suppression of relative rates for residual and voluntary business, from
regulatory constraints on experience rating and ex post dividends, and from other
adjustments that reward policyholders for good loss experience. A more complex
model and more comprehensive data would be required to analyze the shifting
of losses to insurer equity.
An alternative hypothesis to explain the observed phenomena is regulatory
lag in adjusting premiums, following an exogenous increase in losses.20 These
hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive, since political pressure may
contribute to the lag in premium adjustment. While some of our tests cannot
distinguish between a purely mechanical regulatory lag model and one exacer-
bated by political influence, a mechanical regulatory lag model alone cannot
explain the evidence on redistribution between and within classes, as discussed
further below.
C. Testable Implications
The key prediction of this analysis is that rate suppression increases loss
growth. With the available data, we cannot distinguish effects on injuries versus
claims or the impact of incentive distortions to employers, employees, and in-
surers. However, the theory predicts larger effects in the residual market, owing
to both greater distortion of employer/employee incentives and possible pooling
effects for insurers. A possible exception is for claim frequency, where the
employer/employee moral hazard that leads to higher injuries and claims could
18 Patricia M. Danzon, The Political Economy of Workers’ Compensation: Lessons for Product
Liability, 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 305 (1988), uses a general equilibrium model to show that the incidence
of state-mandated workers’ compensation or health insurance may be partly on immobile factors,
such as entrepreneurial capital in small firms.
19 Kwon & Grace, supra note 14.
20 For example, benefit costs per $100 of payroll increased at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent
for 1978–84 and 6.2 percent for 1984–89. Klein, Nordman, & Fritz, supra note 3.
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be offset by higher claim rejection rates by insurers due to reduced incentives
to compete on service quality, leading to lower overall reported claim frequency
in residual markets. Cross subsidies are expected to result in transfer from low
risks to high risks. Other factors that influence cross subsidies are discussed
further below.
IV. Methodology and Data
A. Model
The theory outlined suggests the following basic estimating equation:
t t1 t1 t t1 t1 t[Y /Y  1] p b R  b (R /R )  b B    u , (1)ijs ijs 1 ijs 2 ijs ijs 3 s j ijs
where is percentage growth in loss per $100 payroll between periodt t1[Y /Y  1]
t and period ; subscript i denotes class, subscript j denotes industry, andt  1
subscript s denotes state; is lagged residual-market share (a measure of ratet1R
suppression); B is a vector of state fixed effects or other state-specific charac-
teristics that affect loss growth, such as statutory benefit change; is at t1R /Rijs ijs
control for selection bias (see below); is a vector of fixed industry effects;j
and is a stochastic error term. We estimate equation (1) for the voluntary andtuijs
residual markets separately. The hypothesis that rate suppression exacerbates loss
growth predicts that , with greater effect in the residual market than theb 1 01
voluntary market.
B. Data
The data are from the NCCI for 5 consecutive policy years per state between
1985 and 1991 and are reported by individual rating class. For most of the
analysis, we use data for eight states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Lou-
isiana, Maine, Michigan, and Virginia) that represent different regulatory regimes.
These eight-state data are for the 150 largest classes in each state, with voluntary-
market and residual-market experience reported separately for each class. Al-
though these 150 classes represent only roughly one-third of the classes in each
state, they account for over 80 percent of the market as measured by risks,
premium, payroll, or losses.21 For a larger sample of 27 states, we have classwide
data, that is, data not reported separately for the voluntary and residual markets.
This larger sample of classwide data is used for analysis of between-class cross
subsidies. Since WC claims accrue for several years after the policy is written,
for each policy year we use the forecast (“fully developed”) value of claims and
losses based on the most recent estimate available.22 We convert all dollar values
21 Sixty-four of the classes are in all eight states, 25 are in seven states, and 120 are present in
only one state.
22 Incurred losses are reported as of 1992 for all policy years. The NCCI calculates development
factors based on prior experience which are used to adjust early loss reports to estimated ultimate
value. The development factors are uniform for all classes in a state, hence do not reflect any
differences in payout tails between classes. Provided that any resulting error is uncorrelated with
our explanatory variables, our estimates should be unbiased.
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to constant 1992 dollars using a wage index for payroll and indemnity losses, a
medical index for medical losses, and a weighted average of the medical and
wage index for premiums.
The NCCI rating classes are defined roughly along occupational lines. The
class data on premiums, losses, payroll, and so on, reflect the pooled experience
for that class from all employers who employ the class in the state, from all
insurers. The premium rate for a specific employer (“risk”) would be calculated
as the payroll-weighted average of rates for the classes represented by its em-
ployees, but these class-level data do not report premiums for individual em-
ployers or insurers. The data do report the number of employers for which that
class is the dominant share of payroll (Risks) and the number of employers
reporting any data for that class (Classcount). Manual and standard (after ex-
perience rating) premium rates are expressed per $100 of payroll.
The loss data at the class level exhibit extreme stochastic variation across
years; payroll and number of risks are also unstable, presumably because of
switching to self-insurance and employment changes within insured firms. Be-
cause the annual time trends are very unstable, we aggregate the most recent
3 years as period t and the earliest 2 years as period and define loss growtht  1
as the change between t and .23 Using multiyear mean values averages outt  1
some of the stochastic variation.
Loss Growth. We use three measures of loss growth: absolute loss growth,
simple percentage loss growth, and the natural logarithm of percentage loss
growth.24 These different measures could yield different conclusions. For ex-
ample, it is possible that classes with relatively high initial losses could expe-
rience more rapid absolute loss growth than classes with a lower initial loss
level, but the high-cost class could still have a lower percentage growth rate.
For the log measure, the growth in total loss is equal to the sum of the growth
in claim frequency and severity.
Rate Suppression. Our primary measure of rate suppression is the lagged
class-specific percentage of payroll in the residual market.25 This is the best
available class-specific measure of the percent of employees for whom voluntary-
market rates are perceived by insurers to be inadequate, owing to either sup-
pression of voluntary-market rates or suppression of residual-market rates, which
then constrain the rates that can be charged in the voluntary market. We use the
lagged value of the residual-market share as an instrument for contemporaneous
residual-market share, which could be endogenous. To the extent that the lagged
residual-market share is an imprecise measure of contemporaneous rate inade-
quacy, the resulting measurement error reduces the precision of coefficient es-
23 The 3-year mean loss per $100 payroll is the sum of losses divided by the sum of payroll,
which is effectively a weighted mean.
24 Let denote the mean for the most recent 3 policy years and denote the mean for theY Yt t1
prior 2 years. Absolute loss growth is , percentage loss growth is , and theY  Y (Y /Y  1)t t1 t t1
natural log of percentage loss growth is .ln (Y /Y )t t1
25 The lagged value is the mean over the earliest 2 years.
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timates, leading to downward-biased estimates of statistical significance. As an
alternative measure of regulatory stringency, we also use the ratio of filed to
approved rates at the statewide level.26 This measure of mean statewide rate
inadequacy may be imprecise for individual classes.
Other Variables. To control for state-specific statutory benefit changes,
which may trigger exogenous loss shocks, we include the NCCI’s estimate
(lagged) of predicted percentage change in loss costs for the state. The estimated
effects of this benefit change variable on loss growth may be downward biased,
if states with rapidly growing losses and large residual markets are more likely
to reduce their statutory benefits.27 To test the hypothesis that the insurer moral
hazard effect of residual-market risk pooling increases with the size of the re-
sidual-market deficit, we include the lagged residual-market deficit per $100
payroll in the state.28 A vector of fixed industry effects is included to control for
industry-specific determinants of loss growth.29 In some specifications, we sub-
stitute a vector of fixed state effects for the substantive state-level variables, to
control for other, unmeasured state characteristics that influence loss growth. The
use of class-level data should reduce the risk of bias due to unobserved state-
specific factors.
Outliers. We exclude Maine from some of the analysis reported here. Its
abnormally large residual-market size and unique residual-market mechanism,
with deficit sharing by employees, make its experience atypical, which could
bias conclusions for other states. Including Maine generally yields similar but
less precise coefficient estimates. We exclude from the regressions observations
with missing data on premiums or payroll and extreme outliers, defined as ob-
servations with any loss growth measure (absolute, relative, and percentage
growth in total losses, claim frequency, or severity) more than 4 standard de-
viations from the mean for that variable. Such extreme deviations most likely
reflect the stochastic variation in losses for small classes. This reduced the sample
from 1,050 (after omitting Maine) to 860 observations.
Selection Bias. The theoretical model considers rate suppression’s effect on
loss growth for a group of policies with specified risk characteristics. The ob-
served measures of loss growth in the residual market may be downward (upward)
biased when the residual market is growing (shrinking), assuming that the
highest risks are assigned first to the residual market, such that the expected cost
26 For previous uses of this measures, see Klein, Nordman, & Fritz, supra note 3; and Scott E.
Harrington & Patricia M. Danzon, Rate Regulation, Safety Incentives and Loss Growth in Workers’
Compensation Insurance, 73 J. Bus. 569 (2000).
27 The NCCI measure is a weighted average of estimated effects of statutory changes on the
severity of different types of claims, using the most current distribution of injury costs, that is,
without adjustment for potential changes in accident or claim frequency.
28 The correlation between statewide residual-market deficit and class-specific residual-market share
is .45 (excluding Maine).
29 We use the NCCI class and industry definitions, which are similar but not identical to Standard
Industrial Classification definitions.
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of the marginal risk is less than the average risk. A similar downward bias in
estimated loss growth occurs in the voluntary market because the average ex-
pected loss per exposure unit declines as the voluntary market shrinks, assuming
that the lowest risks are the last to be assigned to the residual market. We therefore
include the growth in the residual-market share, as a control for selection bias.
If shifting of risks between the voluntary and residual markets is significant,
including this control is expected to increase the estimated effect of rate sup-
pression on loss growth in the voluntary and residual markets separately. Esti-
mates of classwide loss growth, for voluntary and residual markets combined,
should be unaffected by switching between the submarkets, assuming that the
total exposure base remains unchanged.
The self-selection of lower risks to self-insurance could lead to upward-biased
estimates of regulation-induced loss growth, if residual-market rate suppression
raises the deficit tax on voluntary-market premiums and hence increases incen-
tives for low risks to self-insure.30 However, our measure of rate suppres-
sion—residual-market share of payroll—primarily reflects rate suppression in the
voluntary market, which should reduce the cost of market insurance relative to
self-insurance and hence reduce incentives to self-insure, ceteris paribus. Any
selection bias due to self-insurance is more likely to affect the coefficient esti-
mates on the statewide residual-market deficit, which measures the potential tax
on voluntary-market premiums.
Heteroscedasticity. Since the dependent variable reflects loss experience for
a class of risks, the residual variance may be related to size of insured payroll,jijs
via the law of large numbers, but may also be related to other unmeasured factors.
A White test indicates significant heteroscedasticity for some ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions. We therefore report approximate t-statistics using
White standard errors. Preliminary analysis showed little if any advantage from
using weighted least squares (WLS), with weights defined as either the square
root of payroll or the predicted value from a regression of OLS squared residuals
on the inverse of payroll and number of risks.
C. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports alternative measures of mean statewide rate suppression: the
residual-market share of premiums, payroll, and risks; the loss ratio, often used
as a measure of price to the insured or profitability to the insurer;31 and the ratio
of filed to approved rates. The mean residual-market share of payroll is similar
30 Anne M. Carroll, The Role of Regulation in the Demand for Workers’ Compensation Self-
Insurance, 13 J. Ins. Reg. 168 (1994), provides evidence that higher ratios of premiums to losses
increase the self-insurance proportion, implying that overall rate suppression might reduce the use
of self-insurance. No relationship is found between residual-market share and the self-insurance
variable.
31 The statewide loss ratio is the unweighted mean of class-specific loss ratios, where each class
loss ratio is the 5-year mean of losses divided by the 5-year mean of premiums.
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TABLE 1
Measures of Rate Supression, by State 5-Year Means, 1985–91
State
Share of the Residual Market Filed/Approved
Payroll Risks Premium Loss Ratio Voluntary Residual Total
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
Michigan .060 1 .124 1 .076 1 .828 2 1.007 2 1.013 1 1.008 1
Georgia .111 2 .248 2 .158 2 .922 4 1.080 4 1.699 7 1.180 5
Illinois .115 3 .260 3 .141 3 .681 1 1.000 1 1.167 4 1.027 2
Virginia .135 4 .289 4 .149 4 .916 3 1.201 6 1.210 5 1.203 6
Alabama .212 5 .387 5 .228 5 1.139 6 1.065 3 1.060 3 1.064 3
Florida .220 6 .513 6 .208 6 1.381 8 1.138 5 1.050 2 1.118 4
Louisiana .364 7 .562 7 .397 7 1.053 5 1.322 7 1.350 6 1.339 7
Maine .775 8 .869 8 .787 8 1.306 7 1.569 8 1.863 8 1.771 8
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TABLE 2
Characteristics of Voluntary and Residual Markets:
Unweighted Means across Classes
A. 1988–91
State
Claim Frequency
(Claims/$10,000
Payroll)
Claim Severity
(Loss/Claim)
Risks/$10,000
Payroll Loss/$100 Payroll
Voluntary Residual Voluntary Residual Voluntary Residual Voluntary Residual
Michigan .118 .199** 5,621 6,102* .042 .100** 6.35 10.69**
Georgia .122 .198** 3,987 5,205** .028 .092** 5.05 10.47**
Illinois .091 .141** 5,566 6,401** .027 .078** 5.05 8.92**
Virginia .077 .113** 4,549 7,857** .034 .085** 3.62 9.07**
Alabama .110 .183** 5,991 6,212 .030 .067** 6.19 11.10**
Florida .110 .148** 9,295 15,352** .035 .164** 10.51 22.60**
Louisiana .095 .137** 7,073 7,372 .033 .086** 6.86 10.58**
Maine .233 .145 8,775 9,466 .054 .065 16.70 13.48
B. 1985–87
State
Claim Frequency
(Claims/$10,000
Payroll)
Claim Severity
(Loss/Claim)
Risks/$10,000
Payroll Loss/$100 Payroll
Voluntary Residual Voluntary Residual Voluntary Residual Voluntary Residual
Michigan .124 .209** 4,570 6,527** .046 .103** 5.28 9.18**
Georgia .144 .191** 2,827 4,139** .033 .073** 4.08 8.07**
Illinois .105 .146** 4,100 4,947** .030 .076** 4.31 7.24**
Virginia .099 .139** 3,637 4,849** .035 .108** 3.67 6.36**
Alabama .129 .195** 4,594 4,169 .033 .074** 5.91 7.73**
Florida .128 .164** 7,784 10,877** .038 .146** 10.30 17.62**
Louisiana .112 .145** 6,094 6,723 .043 .104** 7.13 10.13**
Maine .184 .173 9,982 7,183** .048 .072** 16.59 12.18*
* Difference in means significant at .p p .05
** Difference in means significant at .p p .01
to the share of premium but consistently less than share of risks. This implies
that firms in the residual market on average have fewer employees and/or lower
wages than firms in the voluntary market. The ranking of states by loss ratios
is similar to the ranking by residual-market shares, which confirms that the size
of residual market is a measure of rate inadequacy. The ranking by the filed-to-
approved ratio is less consistent, possibly because this regulatory stringency
measure reflects the magnitude of the difference between filed and approved
rates, rather than the percent of payroll for which the filed rates are inadequate.
Table 2 compares mean claim frequency, claim severity, and total loss per
dollar of payroll, for the voluntary and residual markets in each state, for the
base period (1985–87) and the most recent period (1988–91). The market mean
is the unweighted mean across classes, and each class observation is the weighted
mean over the years included.32 In all states except Maine, both claim frequency
32 For example, claim severity is .3 t 3 t Loss / Claimstp1 tp1
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and total loss per $100 of payroll are significantly higher in the residual market
than in the voluntary market. Claim severity is also higher in the residual market
than in the voluntary market, except in Alabama, Louisiana, and Maine. The
number of risks per $10,000 payroll is two to three times higher in the residual
market than in the voluntary market (except in Maine), which is further evidence
suggesting that residual-market risks are on average smaller firms.33 Maine is
anomalous in having the largest residual-market share (78 percent of payroll, 79
percent of premium, and 87 percent of risks), the highest loss per $100 payroll,
and higher claim frequency and severity in the voluntary market than in the
residual market. This may reflect random noise, given the small exposure base
in the voluntary market.
The evidence in Tables 1 and 2 shows persistent differences across states in
several measures of rate suppression. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
deviations from actuarial rates reflect political influence rather than simply sto-
chastic shocks, in which case they should average out over time. Persistence in
rate suppression clearly spans several rating periods with clear evidence of rate
inadequacy, which seems inconsistent with a purely mechanical regulatory lag
model.
Table 3 reports the absolute, percentage, and log percentage measures of mean
growth rates over all classes in the seven states excluding Maine. The standard
deviations are often several times larger than the means because of small class
size. The mean percentage growth in total loss per $100 payroll between the two
time periods was 16.9 percent, or roughly 7 percent a year. Growth was over
twice as high in the residual market (37 percent) as in the voluntary market (15.2
percent). This growth in losses is driven primarily by growth in claim severity,
for which the marketwide average mean growth is 15.6 percent, composed of
33.9 percent for the residual market and 17.2 percent for the voluntary market.34
Claim frequency grew 2.7 percent overall, composed of an 8.5 percent increase
for the residual market and only a .7 percent increase in the voluntary market.
The more rapid growth in claim frequency in the residual market than in the
voluntary market suggests that any incentive for insurers to deny claims in
response to rate suppression is more than offset by the claim-increasing effects
of weak incentives for loss control by employers, employees, and insurers. For
claim severity, which has higher stochastic variance, the ranking of the residual
and voluntary markets depends on the measure used.
The mean increase in premium per $100 of payroll is 20.5 percent for the
total market, composed of 23.4 percent in the residual market and 19.6 percent
in the voluntary market. This compares to an increase in loss per $100 payroll
of 37.1 percent for the residual market and 19.6 for the voluntary market. This
33 Number of risks per $10,000 payroll is an approximate measure of firm size because risks
includes only the firms for which this is the dominant class, whereas payroll includes the payroll
of all firms with this class.
34 It is possible for the mean for the total market to be less than the means for the two submarkets.
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TABLE 3
Loss Growth Means and Standard Deviations by Total,
Residual, and Voluntary Markets
Variable and Market Mean SD
Absolute Growth ( ):t t1Y  Y
Loss/Payroll:
Total .0069 .0273
Residual .0105 .0810
Voluntary .0041 .0297
Loss/Claim (Severity):
Total .5350 2.2793
Residual .3516 6.2751
Voluntary .4678 2.5831
Claims/Payroll (Frequency):
Total .0488 2.1546
Residual .4673 5.5275
Voluntary (.1972) 2.3931
Premium/Payroll:
Total .0123 .0161
Residual .0153 .0209
Voluntary .0114 .0156
Percentage Growth ( ):t t1Y /Y  1
Loss/Payroll:
Total .1689 .3779
Residual .3705 .8801
Voluntary .1524 .4247
Loss/Claim (Severity):
Total .1563 .3666
Residual .3385 .9321
Voluntary .1724 .4389
Claims/Payroll (Frequency):
Total .0265 .2110
Residual .0847 .3881
Voluntary .0067 .2436
Premium/Payroll:
Total .2049 .1961
Residual .2343 .2370
Voluntary .1963 .1968
log Percentage Growth ( ):t t1ln (Y /Y )
Loss/Payroll:
Total .1038 .3292
Residual .0996 .7201
Voluntary .0729 .3822
Loss/Claim (Severity):
Total .0978 .3084
Residual .0751 .6970
Voluntary .0949 .3591
Claims/Payroll (Frequency):
Total .0060 .2009
Residual .0245 .3397
Voluntary (.0220) .2419
Premium/Payroll:
Total .1732 .0161
Residual .1916 .0209
Voluntary .1659 .0156
Other:
Total: Deficit/Payroll ( )t  1 .1700 .1000
Total: Benefit Growth ( )t  1 1.0206 .1328
Total: Class Residual-Market Share ( )t  1 .1573 .0269
Total: Residual-Market Share Growth .0332 .0716
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suggests an increase in cross subsidies from the voluntary market to the residual
market, which is confirmed in the multivariate analysis below. The mean residual-
market share of payroll is 20.4 percent including Maine and 15.7 percent ex-
cluding Maine. The growth in statewide residual-market share is 4.1 percent
including Maine and 3.3 percent excluding Maine. The inclusion of Maine dou-
bles the estimate of residual-market deficit per $100 statewide payroll, from $.17
without Maine to $.36 with Maine.
The correlation between absolute growth and simple percentage growth in loss
per $100 payroll is .73. Classes with a relatively high initial residual-market
share experienced more rapid growth in their residual-market share ( ).r p .25
Statutory benefit growth is negatively correlated with initial residual-market share
( ), which suggests that benefit constraint was one response to residual-r p .13
market problems.
V. Effects of Rate Suppression on Cost Growth
Tables 4 and 5 report three specifications for the effects of rate suppression
on absolute and log percentage growth of losses and premiums, respectively. To
control for state-specific influences on loss growth, equation (1) includes fixed
state effects. Equations (2) and (3) replace the fixed state effects with substantive
state variables: the lagged predicted growth in benefit costs for the state; the
growth in class-specific residual-market share, to control for between-market
selection effects; and the residual-market deficit per $100 payroll. The reduction
in the adjusted R2, relative to equation (1), indicates that the substantive state-
level variables only partially control for all state-specific influences on loss
growth. All equations include fixed industry effects.
A. Total Loss per $100 Payroll
Table 4 confirms that absolute growth in loss per $100 payroll is positively
related to rate suppression. The estimated effect is almost 10 times greater in
the residual market than in the voluntary market, where it is not significantly
different from zero. Controlling for the statewide residual-market growth (equa-
tion (2)) boosts the size and the significance of the estimated effect of rate
suppression on loss growth in the residual market, but the effect in the voluntary
market is still insignificant. The coefficient of residual-market growth is negative
and significant for the residual and voluntary markets separately, but it is insig-
nificant for the total market. These findings are consistent with the selection
hypothesis, that residual-market growth lowers the mean risk level in both the
residual and voluntary submarkets. Thus equation (1), which does not control
for selection bias, provides downward-biased estimates of the effects of rate
suppression on loss growth. The results for log percentage growth (Table 5) are
similar, implying that rate suppression resulted in greater percentage cost growth
for classes that started at an initially higher level of costs.
For the residual market, these effects are economically as well as statistically
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TABLE 4
Effect of Rate Suppression on Absolute Loss Growth
Loss/Payroll Claim Severity Claim Frequency Premium/Payroll
Total Residual Voluntary Total Residual Voluntary Total Residual Voluntary Total Residual Voluntary
Equation (1)a:
Residual Market
Shareis ( )t  1 .0160 .0516 .0065 .8911 1.9693 1.8920 .3727 3.6227 1.3695 .0303 .0333 .0281
(1.630) (2.103) (.586) (1.027) (1.046) (1.676) (.583) (2.322) (.056) (6.469) (5.705) (5.201)
Adjusted R2 .0468 .0234 .0244 .0371 .0186 .0164 .1168 .0468 .1124 .3434 .3098 .3264
Equation (2)a:
Residual Market
Share ( )t  1 .0205 .0733 .0083 1.2660 3.8926 1.7929 .4243 2.4826 1.2820 .0464 .0517 .0439
(2.184) (3.188) (.837) (1.612) (2.222) (1.836) (.726) (1.782) (1.548) (8.998) (8.192) (7.431)
Residual Market
Share Growthis .0117 .0960 .0469 3.0004 8.7733 3.0262 3.3557 1.0842 .1302 .0116 .0412 .0144
(.763) (2.184) (2.821) (2.216) (2.464) (1.912) (2.956) (.468) (.099) (1.593) (4.858) (1.954)
Benefit Growths ( )t  1 .0444 .0003 .0499 3.6169 8.0533 5.3713 3.6995 29.9557 7.9992 .0992 .2348 .0718
(1.412) (.003) (1.377) (1.595) (.998) (2.106) (1.259) (3.580) (2.554) (6.246) (8.836) (4.827)
Adjusted R2 .0370 .0210 .0199 .0342 .0126 .0175 .0634 .0244 .0661 .2363 .2306 .2140
Equation (3)b:
Residual Market
Shareis ( )t  1 .0164 .0593 .0063 1.0522 2.5722 2.0464 .5525 3.3728 1.6315 .0308 .0370 .0283
(1.699) (2.448) (.584) (1.236) (1.372) (1.893) (.847) (2.174) (1.837) (6.194) (5.823) (4.912)
Deficit/Payrolls ( )t  1 .0045 .0015 .0101 .4742 .0543 1.3765 1.2337 2.0243 .6310 .0265 .0160 .0257
(.612) (.065) (1.256) (.695) (.030) (1.784) (2.129) (1.525) (.992) (7.480) (3.663) (7.050)
Benefit Growths ( )t  1 .0425 .0203 .0388 2.9230 9.9307 4.5692 2.8434 29.4941 7.9552 .0997 .2279 .0717
(1.359) (.170) (1.074) (1.294) (1.232) (1.794) (.976) (3.552) (2.562) (6.220) (8.481) (4.794)
Adjusted R2 .0366 .0144 .0102 .0268 .0034 .0160 .0576 .0265 .0672 .2806 .2224 .2566
Note.—Absolute t-statistics using White standard errors are in parentheses.
a Equation includes state and industry fixed effects.
b Equation includes industry fixed effects.
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TABLE 5
Effect of Rate Suppression on Percentage Loss Growth
Total Loss/Payroll Claim Severity Claim Frequency Premium/Payroll
Total Residual Voluntary Total Residual Voluntary Total Residual Voluntary Total Residual Voluntary
Equation (1)a:
Class Residual
Market Shareis ( )t  1 .0464 .3005 .0083 .0837 .0278 .1773 .0374 .2727 .1690 .1615 .1631 .1676
(.427) (1.448) (.063) (.751) (.140) (1.252) (.633) (2.721) (1.763) (3.659) (3.294) (3.081)
Adjusted R2 .0452 .0101 .0577 .0290 .0045 .0329 .1275 .0446 .1179 .3463 .3214 .3175
Equation (2)b:
Class Residual
Market Shareis ( )t  1 .06513 .4362 .0162 .0897 .2022 .1556 .0246 .2340 .1393 .3912 .4181 .3908
(.660) (2.324) (.140) (.905) (1.118) (1.255) (.467) (2.673) (1.618) (8.094) (7.614) (6.671)
Residual Market
Share Growthis .1746 .5745 .7968 .4172 .4346 .5905 .2426 .1399 .2063 .0912 .1836 .0489
(1.020) (1.714) (3.883) (2.523) (1.371) (2.986) (2.230) (.830) (1.460) (1.260) (2.270) (.647)
Benefit Growths ( )t  1 .6427 1.2655 .6160 .8205 .1788 1.0459 .1779 1.4443 .4298 1.7664 2.6430 1.4800
(1.565) (1.320) (1.358) (2.099) (.194) (2.449) (.726) (3.162) (1.583) (9.303) (10.711) (7.618)
Adjusted R2 .0187 .0049 .0350 .0223 .0007 .0253 .0597 .0223 .0608 .1734 .1766 .1473
Equation (3)b:
Residual Market
Shareis ( )t  1 .0766 .3899 .0453 .1276 .1212 .2321 .0510 .2687 .1868 .1854 .2267 .1859
(.711) (1.905) (.349) (1.158) (.620) (1.704) (.862) (2.746) (1.958) (4.023) (4.232) (3.256)
Deficit/Payrolls ( )t  1 .0734 .0805 .2902 .1954 .0272 .3204 .1220 .1076 .0302 .4209 .3125 .4069
(.815) (.434) (2.745) (2.262) (.154) (3.219) (2.180) (1.187) (.439) (12.072) (7.693) (10.756)
Benefit Growths ( )t  1 .5971 1.1338 .4131 .7093 .2684 .8835 .1123 1.4022 .4704 1.8338 2.6394 1.5367
(1.469) (1.191) (.917) (1.828) (.293) (2.080) (.463) (3.090) (1.748) (9.592) (10.556) (7.896)
Adjusted R2 .0182 .0021 .0245 .0206 .0011 .0263 .0592 .0233 .0576 .2875 .2162 .2540
Note.—Absolute t-statistics using White standard errors are in parentheses.
a Equation includes state and industry fixed effects.
b Equation includes industry fixed effects.
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significant. From Table 4, equation (2), a 10 percentage point increase in
residual-market share implies an increase in absolute loss growth for the residual
market of .007, which is two-thirds as large as the mean absolute loss growth
of .0105 (see Table 3) for the residual market during the sample period. From
Table 5, equation (2), a 10 percentage point increase in residual-market share
implies a 4.4 percentage point increase in log percentage loss growth, compared
to the sample mean log percentage loss growth of 10 percent.
B. Claim Severity (Loss/Claim)
Absolute growth in claim severity is positively related to rate suppression,
with larger effects in the residual market than in the voluntary market, after
controlling for selection bias. This is consistent with the hypothesis of greater
employer moral hazard in the residual market and possibly suboptimal insurer
loss control due to the pooling of losses and weak incentives for quality com-
petition. The positive association between rate suppression and claim severity
growth in the voluntary market plausibly reflects attenuation of experience rating
and constraints on insurer expense margins that often accompany suppression of
average rate levels.35 For log percentage growth, rate suppression is not signif-
icant. This suggests that the positive effect of rate suppression on absolute severity
growth is not large enough to generate a positive percentage effect. In general,
explanatory power as measured by adjusted R2 is lower for the log percentage
growth rate than for absolute growth.
C. Claim Frequency (Claims/Payroll)
At the marketwide level, claim frequency growth is not significantly related
to rate suppression. However, this null overall effect masks a positive effect of
rate suppression on claim frequency growth in the residual market and a negative
but marginally significant effect in the voluntary market. These conclusions hold
for both absolute growth and log percentage growth. Recall that the effect of
rate suppression on reported claim frequency is theoretically ambiguous, because
the positive effect on injuries, due to reduced loss control, could be offset by
lower service quality including higher claim rejection rates and hence lower
reported frequency. The findings here suggest that the tendency for rate sup-
pression to increase injury rates dominates in the residual market, whereas the
negative quality effect dominates in the voluntary market, as expected.
Growth in claim frequency is higher in states where the residual-market share
increased over the period, although the relationship is negative but insignificant
for the voluntary and residual markets separately. The positive association at the
statewide level could reflect selection bias, if the proportion of premiums self-
insured is positively related to growth in residual-market share and residual-
35 Note that the larger share of small firms in the residual market could explain its higher loss
growth but cannot explain the positive association between loss growth and residual-market size.
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market burden; it could also reflect other omitted variables that are correlated
with residual-market share growth.
The insignificant overall effect of statutory benefit growth on total losses masks
different effects across submarkets. Statutory benefit growth is positively related
to claim frequency growth in the residual market but negatively related to fre-
quency growth in the voluntary market. These findings are consistent with the
evidence that the cost-increasing effects of benefit growth are greater where
experience rating is weak.36
D. Premium Growth
Premium growth per $100 payroll is significantly positively related to rate
suppression, for the total market and for the voluntary and residual submarkets
separately. The coefficients for premium growth are similar for the voluntary
and residual markets, whereas total loss growth is not related to rate suppression
for the voluntary market. Thus the positive effect of rate suppression on
voluntary-market premiums appears primarily to reflect cost shifting from the
residual market, confirming that residual-market deficits are borne in part by
policyholders in the voluntary market in the same state. From equation (2), for
the residual market, a 10 percentage point increase in residual-market share
implies an increase in absolute premium growth of .0052, about one-third as
large as the sample mean premium growth of .0153. The predicted increase in
log percentage premium growth for the residual market is 4.2 percentage points,
compared to the mean value of 19.2. For the voluntary market, the predicted
increases in absolute and log percentage premium growth from a 10 percentage
point increase in residual-market share are .0044 and .039, respectively, compared
to the sample means of .011 and .166. Again, these measures are clearly eco-
nomically significant.
Premium growth is also significantly positively related to lagged statutory
benefit growth. The coefficients for percentage growth are significantly greater
than one and greater in the residual market than in the voluntary market, although
coefficients for losses are less than one in all three markets. The larger coefficients
in the premium equations could reflect a lag in adjusting premiums; it could also
reflect other, unobservable state characteristics that are correlated with lagged
benefit growth.
The statewide residual-market deficit per $100 payroll was expected to be
positively related to loss growth in the residual market, under the joint hypothesis
that pooling residual-market losses undermines loss control and that this effect
is greater the larger the size of the residual-market deficit. Contrary to this
prediction, this variable is generally either negative or insignificant in the residual-
market equations for loss growth. However, it is significantly positively related
36 See Ruser, supra note 11. For claim severity, the larger and more significant effect of benefit
growth in the voluntary market than in the residual market may reflect greater noise due to the small
size of the residual market.
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to premium growth, with a greater effect in the voluntary market than in the
residual market. This is further evidence that residual-market deficits are at least
partly passed through to other policyholders in the same state.
VI. Cross-Subsidy Effects of Rate Regulation
A. Theory of Political Influence
Rate regulation permits at least three types of cross subsidy: overall statewide
rate inadequacy, with losses borne by insurer equity; between-class cross sub-
sidies, which may depend on and distort the industrial mix within a state but
leave unaffected the competitive positions of different firms within an industry;
and within-class cross subsidies, which may affect the relative position of dif-
ferent firms within a class or industry. These transfers are not mutually exclusive,
and the norm is probably a combination of all three. We focus here on between-
class and within-class cross subsidies.
Applying the theory of political influence developed by George Stigler, Gary
Becker, and Sam Peltzman, we assume that potential interest groups make rational
investments in political pressure, weighing the expected benefits and costs of
investing in influence.37 Politicians and regulators are viewed as rational inter-
mediaries, responding to influence in the form of money and votes. The political
power of a group depends on the number of votes and dollar resources that it
can bring to bear, which depend on the total value of the potential subsidy to
the group, net of the costs of organization. Larger groups generally have higher
stakes and greater voting power, other things equal. Offsetting this advantage of
size is that a given subsidy rate to a large group must be financed by either a
higher tax rate on other groups or a broader tax base.
For a given potential subsidy to a group, its effective power is expected to be
greater the more concentrated the benefits and the smaller the number of stake-
holders. This assumes that becoming informed and organizing to exert pressure
entail a fixed cost per firm, such that costs of organization are larger, relative to
expected benefits, the greater the number of stakeholders. A group with a larger
number of stakeholders also faces greater free-rider incentives. On the other
hand, it may command more votes.
The theory of political influence often does not yield sharp, testable hypotheses,
and measurement of subsidies and political influence is necessarily indirect.
Nevertheless, these general principles suggest several hypotheses about the char-
acteristics of classes that are likely to be winners and losers from workers’
compensation rate regulation.
37 See Stigler, supra note 2; Becker, supra note 2; Peltzman, supra note 2. For application of these
models to automobile insurance, see Harrington, supra note 7; Scott E. Harrington, Taxing Low
Income Households in Pursuit of the Public Interest: The Case of Compulsory Automobile Insurance,
in Insurance, Risk Management, and Public Policy: Essays in Memory of Robert I. Mehr (Sandra
Gustafson & Scott E. Harrington eds. 1993). For workers’ compensation, see Danzon, supra note
18.
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B. Data and Methods
The theory of political influence suggests a general model of between-class
subsidies:
t t1 t1 tS p a  a P  a B    w ,ijs 0 1 ijs 2 s j ijs
where is a measure of subsidy to class i in industry j in state s, is at t1S Pijs ijs
vector of exogenous measures of political influence of the class in state s,
is a vector of state-specific controls, is a vector of fixed industry effects,t1B s j
and is a stochastic disturbance. Our measures of subsidies and politicaltwijs
influence and their predicted effects are as follows.
1. Measuring Subsidies
Between-Class Subsidies. We use two measures of mean class subsidy. The
residual-market share of payroll (Risks) is a rough measure of percent of em-
ployees (Firms) in the class who pay subsidized rates as a result of regulation.
The statewide loss ratio (Loss/Standard Premium) for the class measures the
average loading charge or price of insurance for the class.38
Within-Class Subsidies. The hypothesis of within-class cross subsidies pre-
dicts that the level and growth of voluntary-market premiums is disproportion-
ately related to the class-specific residual-market deficit, controlling for actuarial
variables and the statewide residual-market deficit. We use the (log) voluntary
premium per $100 payroll and its growth.
2. Political Influence
Relative Class Size. Large class payroll, relative to the mean payroll per
class for the state (Payrollis/Payrollms), indicates a relatively large proportion of
employees in the class and hence relatively high stakes and proportion of votes
represented by the class.39 On the other hand, a subsidy of, say, 20 percent for
a class that accounts for 10 percent of state payroll requires higher taxes on other
stakeholders than for a class that represents only .1 percent of state payroll. The
implication is that relatively large classes may be subsidized but in any case are
unlikely to be severely taxed.
High Risks. Classes with relatively high expected loss per $100 payroll are
likely to benefit from subsidies for several reasons. High-risk classes have a
greater impact on an employer’s overall premium cost, ceteris paribus, hence
38 Since the standard premium for each class reflects experience rating but does not reflect dividends
or schedule credits, our premium and loss ratio measures may overestimate subsidies to high risks
and implicit taxes on good risks. However, insurers often deviate by a fixed percentage from manual
rates, and such deviations from standard premiums are likely to be small in states with significant
rate suppression.
39 Controlling for low wages per employee (see below), large relative payroll indicates a class
with a relatively large number of employees.
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the potential gain from a given percentage suppression of rates is greater. Equity
norms may favor cross subsidies to occupations with high loss relative to wages,
which would reduce opposition to rate suppression for these classes. Subsidies
to high-risk firms could yield efficiency gains by increasing the proportion of
such firms that purchase coverage, thereby reducing negative externalities that
may result if uninsured losses are shifted to other firms.40 As measures of high
risk, we use claim frequency (log(Claims/$100 Payroll)) and claim severity
(log(Loss/Claim)). The natural log transform is used to reflect declining marginal
influence of this motive for subsidy and to reduce outlier influence.
Low-Wage Workers. Actuarially fair premiums are likely to be a larger
percent of payroll for low-wage occupations for several reasons. First, unskilled
jobs may entail greater intrinsic injury risk, and unskilled workers may also be
less skilled at avoiding accidents. Second, the WC benefit structure provides a
higher wage replacement rate for low-wage workers, and the elasticity of medical
loss per claim with respect to wage level is plausibly less than unity.41 Third,
since the residual-market deficit allocation is proportional to premium, the deficit
tax rate per dollar of payroll and per employee is higher on classes with high
premium rates per payroll dollar. This inequity of the residual-market tax system
may be another reason favoring cross subsidies to low-wage classes. We do not
have class-level data on wages per employee. However, loss per $100 payroll is
expected to be positively correlated with low wages. Thus classes with high loss
per $100 payroll are expected to be beneficiaries of rate suppression, because of
both low wages and high risk. These two effects are empirically indistinguishable
with our data.
Firm Size. Large firms face fewer regulatory constraints on self-insurance
than small firms and have size-related advantages of risk bearing, which suggests
that large firms are less likely to be taxed, other things equal. However, small
firm size is likely to be correlated with in-state ownership of a high proportion
of capital, which may be associated with low cost of exerting influence. In-state
ownership of capital would not affect political influence if the full incidence of
rate suppression—costs and benefits—is on workers, all of whom are in-state
residents. But if the incidence of workers’ compensation costs is partly on en-
trepreneurial capital or other immobile firm-specific factors, then domestic firms
may be more successful at exerting political pressure than out-of-state firms. On
the other hand, state-specific sunk investments are vulnerable to appropriation
40 Coverage is optional for very small firms, many of which are high risk. Harrington, supra note
5, applies a similar analysis to high-risk drivers, who are major beneficiaries from rate regulation
in automobile insurance.
41 Although the income elasticity of demand for medical care is positive in broad cross sections
and in time series, this does not necessarily apply to postinjury use of medical services. Moreover,
because workers’ compensation has very low if any co-payments and these are uniform across
income levels, the insurance-induced positive correlation between income and medical care use that
is observed in health insurance data (wealthier families buy more coverage and hence face lower
point-of-service prices) does not apply to medical expense covered by workers’ compensation.
This content downloaded from 130.091.116.052 on June 03, 2016 09:21:11 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
26 the journal of law and economics
of quasi rents, which could make in-state employer capital vulnerable to regu-
latory “taxes.” If firms with out-of-state ownership have lower state-specific
investments, they can make a credible threat to move out of state and hence are
less likely to be heavily taxed.
Thus the predicted net effect of firm size on political influence is theoretically
ambiguous. Small firms are expected to benefit from rate suppression under the
joint hypothesis that small size is correlated with in-state ownership and in-state
ownership reduces the costs of political influence by enough to outweigh the
disadvantages of small size for self-insurance. As a rough measure of firm size,
we use payroll per firm in the class (log(Payrollis/Classcountis)).
Concentrated versus Diffuse Classes. The expected return to an employer
from investment in influencing rates is greater for classes that account for a
relatively large share of its payroll and premium. Moreover, free-rider effects
are expected to reduce the political influence of classes that are dispersed over
a large number of employers, compared to concentrated classes. Classes that
have a relatively large number of employers that employ that class (Classcountis/
Classcountms) are relatively diffuse and hence are expected to be politically weak
owing to free-rider effects. Classes that have a relatively large number of risks,
relative to the mean number of risks per class in the state (Riskis/Risksms), are
the dominant class for a relatively large number of firms and hence are expected
to benefit from rate suppression. However, controlling for relative payroll, a high
value of relative risks could reflect predominantly small firms. In practice, high
correlation between these measures makes estimation of their separate effects
tentative.42
Class Concentration across States. Occupations that are employed in many
states are likely to be relatively mobile, in which case they cannot be heavily
taxed in individual states. On the other hand, classes that are concentrated in a
few states may have a greater payoff and lower costs of obtaining rate suppression
in those states. We use a Herfindahl index of the concentration of each class
across the 27 states in our database. It is expected to be positively related to rate
suppression, if the benefits of concentration outweigh the disadvantages of
immobility.43
Industry Effects. The economic model of political influence emphasizes the
importance of relative power. Thus the industry mix of beneficiary classes could
differ across states, depending on industry mix. On the other hand, certain in-
dustry characteristics—for example, unionization—could enhance the political
42 The correlation between Relative Risks and Classcount is .76; between Relative Risks and
Payroll is .67; and between relative Classcount and Payroll is .96 (seven-state data).
43 The Herfindahl index for each class is the sum of the squared shares of countrywide payroll in
each state in which that class is present. It ranges from 1, for a class that is concentrated in a single
state, to .034 for a highly diffuse class. The mean is .0586, indicating that most classes are relatively
diffuse across the states in which the class is present. States in which a class is not present are
excluded from the measure.
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influence of particular classes in most states. A vector of fixed industry effects
tests for such industry-specific effects.
C. Empirical Evidence of Cross Subsidies
Except where indicated, the analysis uses the same sample of 5 years for the
150 largest classes in seven states. Illinois is omitted because of missing data
on Classcount. To average out some of the stochastic variation, we use 3- and
2-year mean values for periods t and , respectively. Lagged values are usedt  1
as instruments for explanatory variables that are potentially endogenous and for
political variables that are expected to affect premiums with a lag.
1. Between-Class Cross Subsidies
Residual-Market Shares. Our first test of the model of political influence
uses the log odds of class-specific residual market as a measure of political
influence. Table 6 reports results for both share of payroll and share of risks.44
The first equation includes the statewide ratio of filed to approved rates, to control
for the mean statewide level of rate suppression, and current and lagged statutory
benefit growth, to control for possible lags in adjusting premiums to reflect benefit
changes. The second equation replaces these substantive state variables with fixed
state effects. The third equation adds fixed industry effects. The results are
generally consistent with the theory of political influence and similar for the
residual-market share of payroll and risks.
Subsidies are significantly positively related to claim frequency and claim
severity, consistent with the hypothesis that classes with relatively high loss per
dollar payroll, owing to either high-risk activities or low wages, have greater
incentives to seek subsidies and/or face less resistance. Classes with relatively
large payroll, relative to mean class payroll in a state (Payrollis/Payrollms), have
higher residual-market shares, which suggests that number of employees enhances
political influence. Residual-market share is negatively related to mean firm size
(Payrollis/Classcountis), which implies that small firms are more likely to benefit
from rate suppression. This suggests that any advantage of large firm size, owing
to lower costs of self-insurance, is on average offset by the greater political
advantage of smaller firms that are presumably more frequently locally owned.
The significant negative coefficient on relatively diffuse classes (Classcountis/
Classcountms) supports the hypothesis that diffuse classes are politically weak,
owing to low stakes per firm and free-rider problems. The insignificant or negative
coefficient on relative number of risks (Risksis/Risksms) is inconsistent with the
hypothesis that relatively dominant classes are influential. However, these con-
clusions are tentative because of high correlation between these variables and
relative payroll size.
44 The log odds transformation ensures that predicted values, when retransformed, are nonnegative.
Results were very similar using the residual-market share as the dependent variable.
This content downloaded from 130.091.116.052 on June 03, 2016 09:21:11 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
28
TABLE 6
Class-specific Residual Market Shares: 3-Year Means, Seven States
Variable
Share of Payroll Share of Risks
Equation (1)a Equation (2)a Equation (3)b Equation (1)a Equation (2)a Equation (3)b
Intercept 133.5519 3.8548 4.5053 89.0045 .5859 .8527
(11.525) (7.967) (8.185) (8.903) (1.559) (2.022)
log Claim Severityis ( )t  1 .3813 .1213 .1906 .7149 .3474 .3391
(5.604) (1.856) (2.428) (11.663) (6.581) (5.613)
log Claim Frequencyis ( )t  1 .3469 .2050 .3374 .3269 .2043 .2815
(5.381) (3.621) (4.805) (6.344) (5.298) (5.775)
Risksis/Risksms ( )t  1 .0101 .0175 .0174 .0398 .0647 .0449
(.486) (1.078) (1.017) (1.938) (4.127) (3.012)
Payrollis/Payrollms ( )t  1 .0143 .0121 .1118 .0200 .0182 .0617
(1.742) (2.015) (4.979) (2.624) (3.405) (2.840)
log(Payrollis/Classcountis) ( )t  1 .4735 .5190 .5930 .1371 .1826 .1854
(11.748) (13.494) (11.473) (4.453) (7.114) (5.585)
Classcountis/Classcountms ( )t  1 . . . . . . .1537 . . . . . . .0714
. . . . . . (5.568) . . . . . . (2.662)
Statutory Benefit Growths ( )t  1 8.8333 . . . . . . 62.1706 . . . . . .
(24.425) . . . . . . (23.394) . . . . . .
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Filed/Approveds( )t  1 9.9565 . . . . . . 7.8927 . . . . . .
(26.755) . . . . . . (26.248) . . . . . .
Statutory Benefit Growths(t) 6.0891 . . . . . . 35.6351 . . . . . .
(6.582) . . . . . . (4.461) . . . . . .
Alabama . . . .5448 .4775 . . . .4291 .4314
. . . (4.274) (4.004) . . . (4.045) (4.481)
Florida . . . .0433 .1067 . . . .5532 .4971
. . . (.369) (.875) . . . (5.309) (4.952)
Georgia . . . .2856 .3302 . . . .2111 .2007
. . . (2.340) (2.802) . . . (2.130) (2.195)
Louisiana . . . 1.5637 1.4801 . . . 1.4332 1.4202
. . . (11.702) (10.942) . . . (13.123) (13.589)
Maine . . . 3.6414 3.4846 . . . 2.9476 2.9406
. . . (24.494) (22.516) . . . (28.332) (28.507)
Michigan . . . 1.2130 1.3292 . . . 1.4725 1.4679
. . . (10.108) (11.274) . . . (15.378) (16.184)
Adjusted R2 .6388 .7110 .7447 .6030 .7425 .7786
Note.—The dependent variable is . Absolute t-statistics using White standard errors are in parentheses.t tlog[R /(1  R )]is is
a No industry fixed effects.
b Includes industry fixed effects.
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TABLE 7
Classwide (Voluntary and Residual Mark) Loss Ratio (log), 27 States
Variable
Equation (1):
No Fixed
Effects
Equation (2):
Industry Fixed
Effects
Equation (3):
State and
Industry
Fixed
Effects
Intercept .1027 .1841 1.0223
(.859) (1.449) (8.805)
log Claim Severityis ( )t  1 .0905 .0871 .0886
(8.458) (7.528) (7.082)
log Claim Frequencyis ( )t  1 .1271 .1394 .1405
(11.175) (10.669) (10.559)
Risksis/Risksms ( )t  1 .2431 .0231 .0311
(8.665) (8.229) (.701)
Payrollis/Payrollms ( )t  1 .0014 .0017 .0904
(1.209) (1.469) (.940)
log (Payroll/Riskis) ( )t  1 .0334 .0385 .0413
(5.201) (5.035) (4.668)
Statutory Benefit Growths ( )t  1 .5350 .3805 . . .
(.627) (.443) . . .
Herfindahli .2163 .2034 .1360
(3.187) (2.976) (2.105)
(Risksis/Risksms) #R(t  1) . . . . . . .0084
. . . . . . (.191)
(Payrollis/Payrollms) # R(t  1) . . . . . . .0921
. . . . . . (.9581)
Adjusted R2 .0357 .0396 .1112
Note.—Absolute t-statistics using White standard errors are in parentheses.
The ratio of filed to approved rates is strongly positively related to residual-
market shares, as expected.45 Contrary to expectations, both current and lagged
growth in statutory benefits are negatively related to residual-market shares. This
could reflect correlation with other omitted state characteristics or reverse cau-
sality—that statutory changes to reduce benefits were enacted in states with very
high residual-market shares. Of the 18 industry dummies, eight are significantly
negative and the remainder are insignificant relative to agriculture (the omitted
class), which suggests that agriculture is an unusually large beneficiary of rate
suppression. Adding fixed industry effects increases the adjusted R2 by only
3.3 percentage points, which suggests that industry is not an important deter-
minant of political influence.
Classwide Loss Ratios. Table 7 reports results for the (log) classwide loss
45 The t-statistics on the state variables may be upward biased owing to correlation in unobserved
characteristics across classes in the same state, see Brent R. Moulton, An Illustration of a Pitfall in
Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Variables on Micro Unit Data, 72 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 334 (1990).
In this case, the t-statistics are sufficiently large that they are likely to be significant even after
adjustment for potential bias.
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ratio (voluntary plus residual market).46 The sample in these equations includes
all classes in the 27 states for which 5 years of NCCI data are available. The
first equation includes only class-specific variables; the second equation adds
fixed industry effects; the third equation adds state fixed effects. To test whether
the measures of relative influence have greater impact in heavily regulated states,
we include two interactions with an indicator R, defined as one for states in the
top third of the distribution of residual-market shares and zero otherwise. The
low adjusted R2 reflects the extreme variation in these class-specific loss ratios.
Nevertheless, some variables are significant and consistent with predictions.
Loss ratios are significantly positively related to lagged claim frequency and
claim severity, which implies that classes with relatively high loss/payroll or
relatively low wages per employee are systematically subsidized, consistent with
the evidence from residual-market analysis in Table 6. Loss ratios are positively
related to firm size (log(Payrollis/Risksis)), which implies that large firms pay
lower prices. This plausibly reflects scale economies in expense loadings for
large firms47 and hence is not inconsistent with the evidence in Table 6 that
residual-market shares are inversely related to firm size. Loss ratios are signif-
icantly higher for classes with a relatively large number of risks, consistent with
the prediction that dominant classes benefit from regulation. Effects are not
significantly different in heavily regulated states.
The coefficient of the Herfindahl index is negative. The implication that more
diffuse classes have higher loss ratios suggests that mobility across states protects
a class against excessive rates. Adding fixed industry effects has a negligible
effect on the adjusted R2, which confirms that industry effects are not strongly
consistent across states. By contrast, state fixed effects explain an additional 7
percentage points.
2. Within-Class Cross Subsidies
In Table 8, both voluntary-market premium levels and premium growth are
significantly positively related to the class-specific residual-market deficit, in
addition to the statewide deficit. This is consistent with the hypothesis of within-
class as well as between-class cross subsidies. Voluntary-market premiums are
significantly lower for classes with relatively large payroll and significantly higher
for diffuse classes, after controlling for actuarial factors. This is consistent with
earlier results that classes with relatively large stakes or voting power and rel-
atively concentrated classes are more likely to benefit from cross subsidies.
Premium levels are also lower for classes that are frequently dominant classes
for employers. The actuarial variables are as expected: premiums and premium
growth are positively related to expected losses (lagged Lossis/Payrollis) and
46 The log transform reduces the influence of extreme values. Observations at more than 4 standard
deviations from the mean were eliminated.
47 Chelius & Kavanaugh, supra note 11.
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TABLE 8
Class-specific Voluntary-Market Premium Levels and Growth, Seven States
Variable
log(Premium/Payroll)a
Growth in Premium/
Payrolla,b
Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (1) Equation (2)
Intercept 6.6868 9.2859 .1435 .1785
(2.249) (3.291) (1.318) (1.694)
log (Lossis/Payrollis) ( )t  1 .4951 .4374 .0077 .0066
(13.819) (12.111) (7.412) (5.819)
log (Payrollis/Classcountis)
( )t  1 .1139 .1154 .0017 .0006
(6.318) (6.434) (2.925) (.852)
Risksis/Risksms ( )t  1 .1168 .0924 .0003 .000295
(7.679) (7.619) (.786) (1.059)
Classcountis/Classcountms ( )t  1 .0668 .0336 .0010 .0009
(3.313) (2.222) (2.491) (2.361)
Payrollis/Payrollms ( )t  1 .0593 .0281 .0012 .0009
(3.535) (2.294) (3.209) (2.792)
Statewide Deficits ( )t  1 69.5119 113.9467 7.6868 8.2567
(1.495) (2.647) (5.063) (5.487)
Class Deficitis ( )t  1 17.6029 20.8575 .8472 1.372273
(2.545) (2.165) (2.395) (5.326)
Statutory Benefit Growths ( )t  1 .9041 1.2214 .0661 .0565
(1.790) (2.453) (3.911) (3.599)
Statutory Benefit Growths (t) 5.5287 7.8164 .1526 .1943
(2.178) (3.140) (1.752) (2.214)
Adjusted R2 .6914 .7255 .2749 .2844
Note.—Absolute t-statistics using White standard errors are in parentheses.
a Industry fixed effects in second equation only.
b (Premium/Payroll)t  (Premium/Payroll)t1.
negatively related to firm size (Payrollis/Classcountis), which confirms that large
firms pay lower expense loadings. Industry fixed effects again add little additional
explanatory power.
VII. Conclusions
These class data for workers’ compensation insurance confirm the basic hy-
pothesis that rate suppression exacerbates loss growth and hence ultimately leads
to higher premiums, contrary to its initial intent. These effects are economically
as well as statistically significant. The loss-increasing effects are greater in the
residual market than in the voluntary market, consistent with greater employer
moral hazard in the residual market, due to greater suppression of overall rate
levels, attenuation of experience rating, and possibly weaker insurer incentives
for loss control in the residual market. The finding of no significant relation
between loss growth and the size of the statewide residual-market deficit is
inconsistent with the joint hypothesis that pooling reduces insurer incentives for
loss control and that the effect becomes greater as the total size of the residual
market and deficit increase.
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There is strong evidence that rate suppression in workers’ compensation results
in persistent cross subsidies at three levels: between classes within a state, between
low- and high-risk employers within classes in a state, and to policyholders
statewide, presumably from insurer equity. The analysis here has focused on
between- and within-class cross subsidies. These increase as statewide rate sup-
pression increases (see the Appendix). The patterns of cross subsidies are con-
sistent with predictions from a simple model of political influence. High risks
and possibly low-wage workers are generally beneficiaries, owing to higher stakes
and possibly less opposition. Relatively large classes and relatively concentrated
classes generally benefit from rate suppression. Small firms are beneficiaries,
presumably because of advantages in local influence or because small employers
have greater personal stakes in influencing outcomes owing to immobile capital.
Industry effects are generally weak, but state-specific effects are strong. Under-
standing the forces that lead to severe statewide rate suppression in some states
remains an important topic for future research.
Purely mechanical regulatory lag may contribute to the delay in adjusting
premiums in the face of exogenous loss shocks. However, a simple regulatory
lag model cannot readily explain how rate inadequacy can continue for more
than 5 years, spanning multiple rating periods and despite clear evidence of the
inadequacy. The simple regulatory lag model also cannot explain the evidence
on redistribution, with some of the cost of rate inadequacy shifted to voluntary-
market policyholders. Moreover, the pattern of redistribution between classes is
consistent with predictions of a simple model of political influence. Since rate
suppression is counterproductive as well as obvious, its persistence seems im-
plausible in the absence of political pressure from beneficiaries.
The evidence here suggests that rate regulation permits short-term gains by
some groups, notably those with high risks, at the expense of those with lower
risks and insurer equity. But in the long run it is a negative-sum game because
rate suppression exacerbates loss growth. There may be a social concern to
subsidize high-risk firms and activities, although no such objective is explicit in
the regulatory language. This analysis suggests that the costs of such subsidies
should be weighed against any perceived benefits. Rate regulation that encourages
risky behavior and hence increases the growth of workers’ compensation losses
is a high-cost mechanism for achieving these goals.
APPENDIX
Further Evidence of Cross Subsidies
As a test of the hypothesis that at least some of the increase in statewide mean rate
suppression is borne by other policyholders within the state, we examined the relationship
between mean loss ratio and dispersion of loss ratios across classes within a state. If an
increase in statewide rate suppression entails increased cross subsidies between classes
within the state, then states with relatively high mean loss ratios should have greater
dispersion in loss ratios between classes, reflecting the use of excessive premiums (relative
to losses) for taxed classes to subsidize inadequate premiums for other classes. If a higher
This content downloaded from 130.091.116.052 on June 03, 2016 09:21:11 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
34 the journal of law and economics
mean loss ratio for a state overall is not associated with greater between-class dispersion
in loss ratios, then the increase in subsidies to some classes must be borne primarily by
insurer equity or by policyholders in other lines.
We identified states in the top and bottom quartiles of the distribution of state mean
loss ratios in the earliest 2 policy years (period B) and in the most recent
3 policy years (period A). For each of these states, we estimate the distribution of loss
ratios across classes. The evidence confirms that states with a higher mean statewide loss
ratio have a higher interquartile range. For states in quartile 4 in period A, the interquartile
range across classes ranges from 2.4 to 5.7, with a median of .90. For states in quartile
1 in period A, the range is from 1.7 to 4.0, with a median of .60. A similar pattern appears
in period B. This evidence supports the hypothesis that at least some of the deficit increase
associated with increased statewide mean rate suppression is borne by taxed classes in
the same state.
To test the hypothesis that statewide rate suppression effects cross subsidies between
industries within a state, we performed a similar analysis at the level of the industry. If
firms in the same industry have common class structures and lower costs of coordinating
lobbying efforts, for example, through use of industrywide union and employer organi-
zations, then cross subsidies should follow industry lines. We find little evidence that
cross subsidies follow industry lines, at least using the NCCI definition of industries,
which suggests that industrywide lobbying is undermined either by differences in the
class mix across firms in an industry or by other obstacles to cooperation.
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